Who then shall protest?

The Entente is informed that the condemned miners are communists. As France and England are themselves desirous of exterminating the communists, this will certainly not call forth any protest on their part.

The Hungarian social democratic party, which has sold itself body and soul to the government and is now carrying on a quite undisguised patriotic policy, will, on patriotic grounds, not demand the observance of the Peace Treaty which was dictated by the "enemy" and which is not insisted upon by the Entente powers. In addition to this it has its own special reasons for not taking real revolutionary elements under its protection, as the latter during the last ten years caused it a good deal of inconvenience.

The Hungarian proletariat, suppressed and exploited as it has never been before, enslaved and deprived of its minimum human rights, is unable to do anything, as the exceptional law for the "defence of the realm" has shown its effectiveness on every occasion.

But the foreign proletariat, the miners of England, France, America and other States?

The Hungarian government has reckoned without these. It may ignore this factor, it can however be very disappointed in this respect. The voice of the international proletariat, the protest of the international mine workers can make itself heard and, like a tornado, sweep away this entire company, the whole regime of deceivers, scoundrels and murderers.

RED AID

The Murder Government of Zankov Forbids Humanitarian Relief from Abroad.

To the International working class!

To al Humanitarian Circles and Organisations!

The Relief Commission sent from Czechoslovakia to Bulgaria has already been expelled.

The representatives of the workers, peasants and of the humanitarian circles of Czechoslovakia were, with unexampled insolence, expelled from the country when they demanded the consent of the Bulgarian authorities for humanitarian relief action for the innocent children and wives of the victims of the white terror.

This hangmen's government which threatens the parents and relatives of its political opponents with capital punishment for rendering any form of relief to the "conspirators", which forbids the support of thousands and thousands of victims and their immediate relatives and prevents the remittance of monies which have been collected abroad, is even venturing to prohibit humanitarian relief from abroad.

The Bulgarian Embassies in **Vienna** and **Berne** have refused visas to a purely humanitarian relief commission from Austria and a workers' relief commission from Switzerland.

But the murderous Zankov government thereby itself exposes its shameful plans for physically annihilating thousands of workers, peasants and intellectuals, as well as their relatives, their innocent wives and children. It thereby on the other hand shows its fear of the presence of foreign relief commissions in Bulgaria, who would certainly not remain silent in the face of all the cruel deeds which cry aloud to heaven.

We appeal with all our energy to the international working class, as well as to all humanitarian and cultural circles, to protest most energetically against the shameful conduct of the Zankov hangmen, and immediately to despatch relief committees to Bulgaria ,where untold thousands of women and children, the relatives of the victims of the white terror are enduring indescribable misery and even today remain without any relief.

3rd of September 1925.

The Balkan Bureau of the International Red Aid.

For the Exchange of Political Prisoners.

We publish below the text of the statement issued by the German Workers' delegation to Soviet Russia regarding the question of exchange of political prisoners. Ed.

To the Soviet Government and to the II. International.

The German delegation during its visit to Soviet Russia inspected a whole number of prisons. In this connection the delegation devoted its chief attention to the political prisoners, especially in Georgia. It declares that the prisoners are treated in a thoroughly humane manner. The delegation is fully aware that political crimes committed in a state in which the working class has the power in its hand, must be judged from quite another point of view than similar crimes when committed in a capitalist State. Anyone who takes part in or supports actions aimed against Soviet Russia, thereby supports the greatest enemies of Soviet Russia — the capitalists. It does not matter whether this is done consciously or unconsciously — the result in both cases is the same.

But the German workers' delegation is convinced that in the question of political prisoners, some steps must be taken. For some months past there has been a movement in Germany in favour of political prisoners. This movement must at all cost lead to favourable results.

The delegation has unanimously decided to approach the German trade unions and the Parties connected with them with the proposal to obtain from the German government the release of all political prisoners. We therefore approach to the Soviet government with the enquiry: Is it prepared — on the basis of the appeal sent from the International Red Aid to the II. International, which unfortunately has remained unanswered up to the present — on its part to give its consent to the exchange of political prisoners, should the II. International accept the conditions proposed by the International Red Aid?

The main questions which are dealt with in this proposal can be formulated as follows:

1. **The care of political prisoners must be carried out in all countries on the basis of a mutual agreement. The International Red Aid pledges itself to obtain the full approval of the Soviet government to an exchange of political prisoners. At the same time the II. International must pldge itself to endeavour to influence all governments in which it has its representatives in such a manner that the exchang will be mutual.**

2. **In the event of the above proposal being accepted, both parties pledge themselves to exchange information as to the position of political prisoners and to give each other the greatest possible assistance in this respect.**

The First German Workers' Delegation

Freiberger, Hans Beck, G. Mehle, Arthur Lehnert, Thomas Staudt, Eduard Marr, Willy Bennewitz.

IN THE INTERNATIONAL

Letter from the E. C. C. I. to all Organisations and Members of the Communist Party of Germany.

Dear comrades,

As early as the last session of the Enlarged Executive — March/April 1925 — and shortly afterwards, we discussed in detail, in conjunction with the representatives of the German Communist Party, those questions in which, in our opinion, the greatest defects of Party work are evidenced. The most important question — the question of the German Party — was at that time, and still continues to be, the problem of increasing the recruiting powers of our Party, the problem of winning the masses, especially the masses of social democratic workers. Our general political line has been determined from this standpoint, and from this standpoint we have considered the other questions. Among these we find the following tasks; work in the trade unions; convincing the social democratic workers (questions of propaganda, "change of tone", etc); the "normalising" of Party life (inner Party democracy, employment of the former

opposition, freedom of discussion, election of Party functionaries, introduction of fresh leading forces, etc.), was regarded by us at the same time as a prerequisite for the establishment of correct relations towards the masses outside the Party; **the liquidation of the hidden fight against the International** (liquidation of the custom of so-called independent emissaries in other parties, sincere carrying out of the real Bolshevist line).

Before the Party Conference, the representatives of the Executive once more negotiated with the representatives of the German Party, although not entirely officially; this was at the wish of the German representatives.

At these negvotiations the **three** most important groups of questions were discussed.

Firstly: The Executive pointed out the existence of certain **Right** deviations in the leading group Ruth Fischer-Maslow; the adoption of a too parliamentary attitude, etc.

Secondly: It was decided that a really new course should be followed in the **trade union question;** that a strong and capable trade union department be demonstratively elected at the Party Conference, or instructions to this effect given to the new Party Central.

Thirdly: The representatives of the Executive insisted that fresh leading forces are to elected to the Central, especially comrades familiar with trade union work, and including some comrades of the opposition. Not for the purpose of dragging the Party over to the "Right", as has been deliberately wrongly asserted, but in order to a create means of access to the vacillating members of the Party.

The Executive received **three** subsequent inquiries as to the elements of which the Party Central was to be composed, and **three** times it confirmed its advice.

At the Party Conference itself these decisions were, for the most part, **not** carried out. Comrade Ruth Fischer's group not only sabotaged the decisions, but at the same time caused the delegation sent by the Executive to be treated in such a manner that it was obliged to issue a declaration to this effect. At the conclusion of the Party Conference an offer of an alliance on the part of the Scholem-Rosenberg group against the Executive was tacitly accepted, a proceeding void of all principle, seeing that politically the Party Conference was being carried on in the spirit of fight against the Ultra Left. A conflict with the representatives of the Youth International was brought about in an analogous manner; the International Youth Conference, in which the representatives of 13 countries participated, has officially stated its standpoint with regard to this, and addressed an appeal to this effect to the Executive.

This brought about a severe crisis. The **first** delegation coming to us with instructions for the disavowal of the E. C. C. I. delegation was obliged to admit, after a heated discussion, that the Executive was right. The whole delegation made a declaration to the effect that it held the criticism made by the E. C. C. I. to be correct, that it considered the standpoint represented by the E. C. C. I. delegation to have been right, and that it was in agreement with the political line taken by the Youth representatives and by the International Youth Conference.

Meanwhile it was decided — at the wish of the German delegation — to have the larger body of representatives sent for. Ruth Fischer employed every possible means in order to delay their arrival.

The **second delegation** was divided into two groups. At first comrade Ruth Fischer opposed the criticism of the E. C. C. I., but after a long discussion in the Commission of the E. C. C. I., participated in by the representatives of all the leading Parties, she too made a declaration acknowledging the correctness of the criticism made by the E. C. C. I.

This, briefly stated, is the state of affairs. We wish however to add some further explanations, for the purpose of making the standpoint of the Communist International clear to the German comrades.

1. The General Situation.

The world political situation may be regarded as extremely critical. Despite the relative stabilisation in Central Europe, the fundamental inconsistencies of modern capitalism are causing a state of extreme tension. The rapid growth of the Soviet Union, the decline experienced by England, the successes of the International Red united front (Anglo-Russian trade union bloc and the struggle for unity; the German and other workers' delegations to Soviet Russia; the workers' and peasants' congresses in France; the revolutionising of the whole English labour movement, etc.), and the enormous increase in the acuteness of the colonial and semi-colonial struggles for freedom (Morocco, Syria, and especially in China) on the one hand; and on the other hand the concentration of imperialist forces against the Soviet Union (the military-diplomatic "ring" around Moscow; agitation in the bourgeois press; English policy and the security pact; preparations for war and blockade; the attitude adopted by Kautsky and the social democratic press, etc.) — these are all symptoms of the general aggravation of the situation.

Among this complex of symptoms one of particular importance is Germany's **fresh orientation** towards the West. This orientation is creating another general trend of feeling among the people, and is even mirrored to a certain extent among the least class-conscious sections of the proletariat.

Two different processes are to be observed among the German people. In the first place the fresh wave of sympathy for the Soviet Union; the social democratic workers are beginning to develop towards communism. Not directly towards the Communist Party, but by roundabout paths and in novel ways, which the Party must learn to estimate. A typical example is furnished by the workers' delegations.

On the other hand, we have to record the growth, in certain — if small sections of the working class of the so-called "anti-Moscow" tendencies, an expression of the fresh orientation of the bourgeoisie. This process is also going on in the German C. P. to a certain extent. The so-called Ultra Left tendency is frequently merely a cloak for social democratic, reformist, "Levitic" tendencies, which threaten to change into direct betrayal of the international working class. These two processes are of an international character, and are thus of particular importance.

There is no doubt that a number of circumstances greatly increasing the difficulties existed at the time when the Left took over the leadership of the Party. The October defeat, six months of illegality, the MacDonald government, Left elections in France and the Dawes report with its resultant reformist illusions among broad strata of the working class. But in spite of all this, the losses sustained by the Party, unavoidable to a certain degree, would not have been so great if the leaders of the Party had not committed the above grave errors.

In spite of this we must state here that the above-mentioned group of leaders in the Party Central have not by any means showed themselves capable of reacting properly to the new processes taking place in the working class. Although the general situation is by no means unfavourable, the number of members in the Party, at best, only maintains its level; there is a serious falling off in the trade unions; there were serious losses at the political elections; the recruiting powers of the Party are insufficiently developed, despite the apparent unity, which is by no means a Bolshevist unity. This is the point which has now been reached. The Party leaders have not proved capable of winning over the social democratic and non-party workers.

The Ruth Fischer-Maslow group has not proved capable of an energetic fight against the "Ultra Left", in reality anti-communist tendencies, and has even supported these tendenties by playing a highly ambiguous rôle in international questions

2. Trade Union Work, the Comintern, and the Leading Groups in the Party Central.

These defects in leadership have been most strikingly evidenced in the trade union question. As early as the Frankfort Party Congress (1924), at which the victory of the German Left over Brandlerism was decided, considerable differences arose between the Executive and the new German Party leaders in the trade union question. The leading group Maslow-Ruth Fischer, it is true, opposed the crassest advances made by the Ultra Left abandonment of work in the reformist unions, but their half-hearted decisions (for instance, with reference to the independent unions) showed their failure to grasp the fundamental essence and the full extent of the problem of our trade union work. This lack of understanding of the importance of trade union work has practically had the effect of causing the Maslow-Ruth Fischer group for months to carry out the decisions of the Comintern imperfectly. A confidential telegram sent by the Executive after the

Frankfort Party Congress was sent in a cicular to all the district secretaries for the purpose of inciting these to protest against the Executive; the anti-trade union propaganda in the ranks of the Party was inadequately combatted up to the V. World Congress.

At the V. World Congress the slogan of international trade union unity was placed on the agenda for the first time. This Congress regarded this new slogan as the fundamental element of our whole Bolshevist strategy, the first aim of which is the winning of the majority of the working class. In this connection the V. World Congress analysed the MacDonald government as what it really was: the reflection — though false and reformist — of a profound historical process of development in the English working class.

The German delegation, under the leadership of Ruth Fischer, at first opposed the propositions of the Executive at the V. World Congress. A veiled insinuation was made that the struggle for international trade union unity was merely a "move in the game of Russian foreign politics", an attempt at a rapprochement to the social democratic MacDonald government.

It was not until after lengthy negotiations that the delegation allowed itself to be convinced of the untenableness of its policy. The accusation that the struggle for trade union unity was merely a diplomatic move in Russian foreign politics can only be attributed to a fundamentally anti-Bolshevist and social democratic mentality on the part of the leading group. The like accusation was made by MacDonald himself, and by all the English and international social traitors, in order to discredit the struggle for trade union unity.

The struggle for unity among the trade unions is a constituent of Bolshevist strategy towards the majority of the international working class. Those who have not grasped this have not been able, and are still unable, to form a correct estimate of the total world political constellation of the present day, and are even less able to carry out the tactics of the Comintern in their own country with full energy.

The lack of comprehension revealed by the leading group in the international trade union campaign is on a line with the serious errors and omissions of this group in their trade union work in Germany itself.

The decisions of the V. World Congress in the trade union question have been "carried out" too much by means of mechanical pressure and threats of organisatory measures.

On the other hand the actual work of enlightenment, the ideological education of the members of the Party to an understanding of our trade union policy, and the working out of a positive line of policy with the A. D. G. B. (General German Trade Union Federation) have been exceedingly deficient.

This has meant an increase in the severe losses suffered by our Party of late years in every sphere of trade union work. Whilst the opposition counted 88 delegates at the last congress held by the General German Trade Union Federation (1922), at this year's congress it was represented by only 2 delegates. We have lost a number of payment centres and local cartels. Not only in numbers, but in ideology, and above all in organisation, we have greatly lost influence among the free German trade unions with their more than 80% non-party membership. Although there are a number of objective factors (the changed political situation, the mass expulsions, the reactionary statutes and election stipulations of the trade unions) which have also contributed to bring about these losses, still the errors and omissions of the leading group of Party leaders have played the main rôle.

The main errors of our trade union work consist of the incapacity to grasp and secure, politically and organisatorically, the trends and currents favourable to us among the broad masses of the working class. For some months there have been signs of the gradual reawakening of political activity among large sections of the German working class (the building workers' strike and various other wage struggles in the different branches of industry, the wood workers' struggle, great demonstrations in various cities, successful Red Days, etc.). The Party leaders have not shown themselves capable of reacting to these new phenomena, above all they have not been able to take advantage of them for our trade union work.

We have already mentioned that comrade Ruth Fischer's group dissolved the former trade union department of the Central without according the matter due consideration. The express undertaking of the representative of the Central to propose the renewed formation of a strong trade union department at the 10th Party Congress, was not adhered to. There can only be two explanations of this omission: either the leading group **forgot** to carry out the decision of the Comintern, or it did not **want** to carry it out. Should the first be the case, then the leaders forgot one of the most important political and organisatory tasks of the Party; should the second be the case, then they sabotaged the will of the Communist International. In either case they have undertaken a serious responsibility towards the Party and the International.

One of the reasons why the leading comrades of this group neglect the trade union question is their lack of faith in the political power and activity of the masses, both of the members of their own Party and of the working class in general. This pessimism, which is anything but Bolshevism, on the part of various leading comrades has, for instance, been expressed as follows:

> "If we disregard the head functionaries, and take the trouble to descend into the ranks of the members, we shall find that our proletarians in the shops and factories are very uncertain in their defence of the Communist Party. They do not feel themselves as the victors of the future, but as people following a tradition for the sake of decency." (Speech delivered by comrade Ruth Fischer at the Central Committee meeting on 9/10 May 1925. See protocol in the pamphlet: "The monarchist danger and the tactics of the German C. P." p. 55).

We are firmly convinced that these declarations represent an undervaluation of the Communist Party of Germany, a Party which, despite all its defects, is one of the soundest and best proletarian sections of the Comintern.

An even crasser statement is that contained in Ruth Fischer's speech (in the German Commission of the Presidium) to the effect that "the masses flee from everyday life, and play at soldiers":

> "I believe the cause of the difficulties arise from two main sources, these however being again connected with one another. Firstly, a concealed trend of feeling, deep down among the masses of the members, towards liquidation, which says: We have won no victory, why should we trouble ourselves to build up a Communist Party. We can just as well carry on class warfare among the social democrats. As an example and proof of this we may cite the really impassioned enthusiasm with which our Party members take part in demonstrations and in the Red Front Fighters' Union. Why? Because they can hereby imagine that they are conquering power, they can play at making revolution without performing any organisatory work. It is my conviction that our comrades take refuge in the demonstrations to save themselves the daily work in the trade unions and factories."

These ideas have nothing whatever in common with either a correct estimate of the actual situation, nor with Bolshevism. They are an attempt on the part of the leading group to substitute a **false** criticism of the totality of the party members for self-criticism. This undervaluation of the Party members and of the working masses is a further key to the errors of the comrades in question, in trade union and other work.

The actual task incumbent on the Party is precisely the opposite of this; it should increase the confidence of the Party in its own power and in all the sound forces existing in the working class; it should awaken the fighting spirit of the Party, and arouse its consciousness of its growing strength.

3. Relations to the Communist International.

The great political currents stirring the working class are not without influence on the Party representing the revolutionary vanguard of the proletariat. The impulse felt by ever-broadening strata of the working class towards affiliation with the victorious working class of the Soviet Union is mirrored within our own ranks by their permeation with Leninism, and with the experience gained by the Bolsheviki. And on the other hand, the vacillations and treacheries of certain labour groups, influenced by the bourgeois anti-Moscow agitation, have their final effect in the "anti-Moscow" tendencies, that is, the tendencies directed against the Soviet Union, against the Russian C. P. and against the Comintern within our Party.

This danger is all the greater in the German C. P. because all its nuances and currents, without exception, are at the present day still, to a large extent, subordinate to the influence of social democratic "West European" traditions.

Every deviation from communist policy which has hitherto occurred in Germany has begun with an attack upon Soviet Russia, the Russian C. P., the Comintern. Seven years of experience in the German revolution have taught us that **all** deviations of this description, no matter whether disguised as "Right" or "Left", have either developed directly into social democracy, or have practically entered into an alliance with it. This applies to the German Communist Labour Party, to Levi, to Friesland, to various followers of Brandler, to the Schuhmacher group, etc.

The changes in the political situation, the final transition of the German bourgeoisie to a Western orientation, the climax reached by social democratic agitation against Soviet Russia, render the danger of anti-Bolshevist deviations in the German C. P. at the present juncture greater and acuter than ever.

The Ultra Left group Scholem, Rosenberg, Katz, who reproach the Comintern and its most important parties of "opportunism", have nothing in common with Leninism, but on the contrary their relations to the Comintern and their attitude towards the problems of the German revolution are expressly anti-Bolshevist in character.

Dangerous and essentially social democratic deviations of this nature are to be found, however, not only in the officially Ultra-Left group, but among the leading persons in the Maslow-Ruth-Fischer group. Comrade Maslow's writings cannot be regarded as a contribution to the serious, conscientious, theoretical education of the Party in the spirit of Leninism. His latest literary works in particular are a concealed and extremely dangerous attack upon the principles of Leninism, and against the whole policy of the Comintern at the present period.

In his book: "The two revolutions of 1917" (vol. 1, part. 4. p. 45), comrade Maslow writes as follows on the 3. World Congress of the C. I.:

> "I am firmly convinced that such grave errors were committed at the Third World Congress that this congress did far more harm than good to the European (!!) parties. **Certainly this applies to the German C. P.**...
>
> At the Third World Congress a general attack was made on the Left, and which was carried to a ridiculous point: comrade Trotzky discovered highly acute "Left dangers" even in Frossard's party... in the French C. P. **It is to be regretted that comrade Lenin made the same mistake.** It is the sole error known to me (!) in Lenin's dealings with the Party. **Thus to fail to recognise the character of a party like the German C. P.**, with its powerful social democratic traditions, especially under rightly recognised objective conditions **which offorded no opportunity for Left excesses**...
>
> The Third Congress declared Levi to be actually in the right...
>
> The Congress drove the German Party (like the French) to the Right, **brought about a serious and lengthy liquidatory crisis**..."

The Executive declares before the whole Communist International that this monstrous attack upon Lenin and Leninism cannot be tolerated under any circumstances.

The reproach that the Comintern not only recognised Levi's criticism of various Ultra-Left errors in the Party, but declared the group of renegades around Levi to be "actually in the right", "drove" the "European parties" into opportunism at the Third Congress, and "brought about" the liquidation current in the German Party, is a repetition of the assertions made in 1921 by Rühle, Pfemffert, and those adherents of the Communist Labour Party of Germany who have since landed in the camp of counter-revolution. Comrade Maslow attempts to oppose to Lenin's alleged "opportunism" a "pure", "left", and specifically "West European" Communism. This is precisely the standpoint taken by Paul Levi, Frossard ,Höglund, and all the enemies of Leninism.

Behind the mask of combatting Trotzkyism and the renegade Levi, Maslow prepares his attack on Lenin, who "failed to recognise the charakter of the German C. P.". Beneath the cloak of combatting "West European" deviations from Communism. that is, anti-Bolshevist deviations, Maslow propagated a "West European Communism" of the worst kind.

It is not by accident that today, in 1925, comrade Maslow makes precisely the Third World Congress the object of his attack.

The Third Congress embodies precisely **that** concrete link in the chain of the development of Leninism and of the Comintern which is of the greatest immediate practical significance in the present situation for all Communist Parties, but above all for the German. The Third World Congress took place at a turning point of international proletarian revolution, at the moment of transition from the period of tempestuous revolutionary upheaval in the years immediately following the war, 1919 and 1920, to the period of slower revolutionary development in 1921 to 1925 — and beyond this. The fresh estimate of the international situation enabled the Third Congress, under the leadership of Lenin, to draw fresh conclusions for the tactics of all Communist Parties.

Whilst the I. and II. World Congresses determined only the general outlines of the strategy and tactics of the Comintern, the Third Congress worked out the concrete policy to be pursued by the Communist Parties during the present transitional period between two revolutions. It placed the slogan: **"Go to the masses"** in the centre of our policy that is, it directed our course towards the winning over of the great majority of the working class. With this it created the beginning of the **Bolshevist united front tactics**, the axis around which our present policy revolves.

Those who — like comrade Maslow — deny this important turning point in our tactics, those who seek to discredit it as a "swing to the Right", those who deride it as a concession to Trotzkyism or to the apostate Levi, **are attacking the fundamental principles of the Comintern.**

The practical consequences of comrade Maslow's false theory are inevitable. If we delete out the basis of the united front tactics, the results in practice must be zero. If we assert that "Lenin failed to recognise the character of the German Communist Party", then we cannot lead this Party in the spirit of Leninism. Comrade Maslow's ideology is antagonistic to Leninism, not only in tactics, but in principle. It is one of the roots of the resistance still opposing the tactics of the Comintern in the German C. P. today. It is one of the roots of the years of misunderstanding encountered in **trade union work**, this main centre of our policy, among the leading group of the German Central. And finally, it is one of the roots of the continous coquetting on the part of the alleged "combatters" of the Ultra Left group, **headed by comrades Maslow and Ruth Fischer**, with precisely this group itself.

Since the Third World Congress, the attitude of the Maslow group to the Comintern has been unsound and un-Bolshevist. At the Jena Party Conference this group opposed the standpoint held by Lenin and the Executive. Not only did it criticise — and quite rightly — the opportunist distortion of the united front tactics on the part of the Brandler group, but it brought forward all manner of objections and reservations against the actual united front tactics of the Comintern, and against the slogan of the "Workers' and Peasants' Government". Up to recently these anti-Bolshevist tendencies possessed decisive influence in this group. The fact that the Maslow Ruth Fischer group, despite all warnings from the Comintern, combined with the Scholem-Rosenberg-Katz group to form a firm unit until five months ago did not fail to bring its punishment. At the Frankfort Party Congress various "anti-Moscow" advances were made (in the trade union question, in the question of the selection of members to compose the Central, etc.). In spite of the objection raised by the Executive, comrade Ruth Fischer **sent** several emissaries to various sections during the course of the past year, entrusted with the "mission" of altering the tactics of the Executive by fractional means. The result of these emissaries' journeys has been the discrediting and alienation of the German Party in the brother parties of the Comintern.

These tendencies were expressed with special clearness at the last Party Congress. All the proposals made by the Executive in the trade union and Central questions were rejected, despite the given undertaking to accept them. At the Party Conference not a word was said — except in comrade Thälmann's speech — about the promised demonstrative change to be made in our trade union tactics.

Every delegate to the Party Congress received from the Central a copy of a special number of the Berlin "Funke", the main contents of which were a — "diplomatic" — attack by Maslow on the Comintern. In this article, entitled: "Some

observations on our 10th Party Congress", Maslow wrote as follows:

"The subsequent Left of the German CP., before the IV. World Congress, raised the demand of **'Back to the II. World Congress'** in this sense, and quite rightly. Comrade Zetkin, in her above-mentioned book of memoirs, relates that Lenin laughed at this 'foolishness'. I do not doubt it, for I can easily imagine how this slogan was presented and interpreted to him...

It is not for nothing that the IV. Congress, despite **Lenin's derision**, expressly confirmed the 21 conditions, and it is not for nothing that the V. World Congress was compelled... to return deliberately and emphatically to the principles of the Second..."

Here again Maslow attempts, by means of demagogic confrontation of the II., IV. and V. World Congresses on the one hand, and the III. on the other, to destroy ideologically the political development of the Comintern, and to discredit the principles of communist policy at the present period. Maslow also makes the untrue assertion that: **"The Levites, unfortunately, have received the actual support of the Russian comrades."**

This agitation against the "Russian comrades" is followed in Maslow's article by the equally dangerous legend that "the Levites rightly regarded themselves as victors at the Congress in Moscow (!)".

"The Third Congress", proceeds Maslow, "had above all the effect of preventing the German CP. from finding clearness for itself. Thus the Third Congress... exercised a similar effect upon the German CP. as the Heidelberg Party Conference two years previously; despite correct decisions... **a harmful effect**."

"If the principles of the II. Congress had been propounded without the bogey of 'Left' dangers being raised... then in all probability the crises in the German and French Communist Parties would have been considerably shortened.

But the Executive too, and the Russian comrades (!) were not at all agreed..."

Maslow writes further that not his group, but the Executive, "has for a long time prevented the German Party from entering into satisfactory relations with the Executive".

He relates with complete approval the following incident:

"When the Executive endeavoured, after Jena, to correct its (completely unjustifiable) attack by inviting a Berlin delegation to visit Moscow, it was too late; the delegation unanimously declined this **invitation to a feast already over**, and Friesland, already Right, wrote the letter of refusal at the request of the organisation."

This last paragraph is an unexampled attempt at lowering the Communist International in the eyes of the German workers.

The anti-Bolshevist dalliance in Maslow's group is in itself the best proof that Lenin was not merely "setting up the bogey of Left dangers" at the III. World Congress, but that these dangers still exist today, four years after the III. World Congress, and are hampering the development of the German Party, hindering its participation in sound political work, and poisoning its ideology. The most expressed representative of these Left, or rather Levitical dangers, is Maslow himself with his conception of the III. World Congress.

The whole German Party, above all the best comrades of the German left in all the Party organisations and districts, are faced with the duty of exerting their utmost efforts to break with the non-Bolshevist system of relations between the Party and the Comintern promoted by the Maslov-Ruth Fischer group.

Another thing which must be broken with — definitely broken with, is the system of "bookkeeping by double entry" employed by the above mentioned comrades for a full year in their relations to the Comintern. Instead of sincerely carrying out the correct lines laid down by the Comintern, this group has made continual attempts at side-tracking, substantiating their action to their own Party members by references to an alleged "pressure to the Right" on the part of the Eexecutive; at the same time they have offered systematic resistance to the Executive, by referring to an alleged "Ultra Left tendency" among the members of the German Party.

The experience gained during the fighting period just past, since the Frankfort Party Conference, have proved to every German communist that the Comintern has proved to have been unconditionally right in every disputed question with the Maslow-Ruth Fischer group. It has been right in the united front tactics and in the trade union question. It was as right in the question of the Presidential Election as it has been in its warnings — disregarded for years — as to the Ultra Left dangers in the German Party.

We are firmly convinced that the Communist workers of Germany will speedily recognise that in the present struggle for the inner Party course to be pursued by the German CP. for its relations to the Comintern, for its relations to the masses of the workers, for its relations to Leninist theory, the **Comintern is absolutely in the right**, whilst the Maslow-Ruth Fischer group is **unconditionally in the wrong** in all these questions.

4. The Inner Line of the Party.

The leading group of the Party Central has not showed itself capable of adopting the right measures for gaining access to the masses. Another reason for this failures has been the wrong line of inner Party policy pursued by this group.

As already mentioned, the question concerning inner Party life were discussed in detail with the representatives of the German Central at the Session of the Enlarged Executive. These representatives of the Executive pointed out that the ultra- centralism, the mechanical pressure, the predominantly administrative measures, the lack of propaganda and of any methods for spreading conviction, the dread of fresh forces, etc., were bound to be absolutely disastrous in effect. At this consultation it was decided to strengthen the inner Party democracy. We were of the opinion that after the victory over the Right has been won, and the Left has the upper hand in the Party, the organisatory guarantees for an all round correct general policy are given, and the problem of Party **education** comes into the foreground. On the other hand, we believed that the circle of the new cadre of leaders was to be widened: The possibility of making a wider selection of Party functionaries should be guaranteed, and this cannot be done without discussions, eligibility for election, and a conscious policy towards attracting and testing new workers. In this connection we further demanded that fresh forces should be employed, among these the best members of the former opposition, who have remained true to the Comintern and to the Party. This work has however not been done. On the other hand, this question formed for us a part of the question of the relations towards the non-party and social democratic workers. For when purely administrative methods are employed in the Party, the same policy is applied on a larger scale to the workers outside of the Party, and the result is the cutting off of the possibility of winning over fresh workers. We believe that unless the Party undertakes these inner party reforms, it will not be capable of carrying out a correct policy among the masses. For this reason the Executive demanded these reforms to be made in the direction of "normalising Party life". During the session of the Enlarged Executive the German delegation, headed by comrade Ruth Fischer, **accepted** these proposals.

These problems were discussed once more with the German delegation before the Party Conference. The Executive proposed that the Central should be enlarged by a number of Party workers closely connected with the masses. Among other points, the Russian comrades pointed out that since Lenin's death the Russian CP. has greatly increased the number of members in its Central, thus strengthening the Central, establishing its authority more firmly, and at the same time improving its communications with the mass of the Party which — in combination with the inner Party democratisation — created better connections with the masses of workers outside of the Party (Lenin recruitment).

The German Party Conference however was prepared and carried out in such a manner that, in spite of all promises, the direct contrary was attained Although there exist strong wing groups in the Party (Ultra Left and Right), this fact was not reflected in the least at the Party Conference itself. There was no political discussions, as every delegation had discussed in detail beforehand what was to be said; even at the Party Conference itself — the highest instance of the Party —, freedom of discussion wos annulled. How scanty were the preparations made for the Party Conference may be seen from the printed motions sent in by the districts. Only seven motions were proposed: one referring to Esperanto (!), four to subscriptions, one to worker correspondents, and one to courses of communal instruction.

Analogous phenomena are to be recorded in the sphere of ideology. Never in the labour press has one witnessed such ad-

vertising as that accorded to comrade Maslow's pamphlet. As a matter of fact this pamphlet consists solely of **correct** quotations and thoroughly **incorrect** observations furnished by comrade Maslow. It was according to this pattern that it was attempted to develop the mental life of the Party.

This would not matter so much if the personal authority of the leaders stood very high. But this authority must possess some prerequisites, and not merely be mechanically acquired. Unfortunately, these prerequisites are lacking, and this is a danger for the whole Party.

In the Party there is a lack of control **from below**, that is, from the members of the Party. At the same the leading group has been cerrying on a perpetual struggle against control **from above**, that is, from the Executive of the Comintern. In this manner such a state of affairs was created as led to a loss of sense of responsibility, which led to various and quite intolerable things.

Such a structure of the Party renders impossible the development of its recruiting. Such a system as this destroys the Party itself. This system must be done away with, in order that an even worse crisis may be avoided, a crisis which might be really catastrophic in effect.

5. The Danger of Lack of Principle.

Practical Bolshevism consists, among other things, in acting upon theoretically acknowledged, honestly thought out political lines. But in the Maslow-Ruth Fischer group the inner conviction, the inner estimate of the situation, is in obvious conflict with the line accepted. The underlying basis of this group is extremely pessimistic; it lacks revolutionary perspective; it is filled with the conception that the masses are completely passive, fleeing from everyday life, **playing** at soldiers, etc. The task of winning over the masses is impossible of accomplishment. And on the other hand the Comintern "demands" that the masses be won. Here already there is consistency within this leading group. Its **pessimism** leads to its coquetting with the Ultra Left. The demands of the Comintern are met with an acknowledgment, on paper, of these demands, and with an endeavour to realise them in life, but without faith in them. Hence the vacillating attitude and political flabbiness of this group, a flabbiness combined with a diplomacy of the worst description in its relations to the Comintern.

A typical example of this is the Tenth Party Conference.

We have already referred to the "intellectual" preparations made for the Conference: comrade Maslow wrote the articles, the sole purport of which was to discredit the importance of the III. World Congress, to deprive the whole tactics of the International of their basis, and at the same time to lay the foundation for the Ultra Left groups.

Formally, however, the fight was **against the Ultra Left** at the Conference. But as soon as it came to a conflict with the International, the **political line was immediately forgotten** and the bloc with the Ultra Left formed. And in Moscow comrade Ruth Fischer declared that the Party Conference had tended to the Ultra Left, and that she could do nothing against it, although anxious to do so! On the one hand, support is lent to Ultra Left tendencies, and on the other hand it is declared: We found ourselves in a state of emergency.

These "tactics" already possessed their traditions. In Moscow comrade Ruth Fischer declared over and over again that the "masses" hinder her in carrying out the policy recommended by the Executive, whilst in Berlin she has stated the CI. forces an incorrect policy upon her.

This habit also found expression in comrade Schneller's speech in Moscow — comrade Schneller has since admitted this error — in which he declared (in order to defend **persons**) that the Left was **bankrupt. We consider this assertions to be wrong. It is not the Left which is bankrupt, but some of the leaders of this Left**, and the Left itself will hold its own along other lines, winning over ever-increasing numbers of the Party members, and developing energetic and positive work.

In the fundamental contention against the Communist International a great part is played by the argument that we are constantly wanting to "drive the German Party to the Right".

We once more here expressly point out that in all important problems subsequent experience has **completely** justified the standpoint of the Comintern. This is now clearly understood by **everyone**. Only a politically completely limited mind could fail to grasp that without these tactics we should have had today, in place of the Party, merely a small group of communists, and of very bad communists at that.

The **legend** of the constant "driving" of the Party towards the "Right" by the Comintern must be completely and finally destroyed. We emphasise that at the present moment the Executive is not criticising the leading group from the "Right", but **from the Left**. Any argument brought forward in support of the assertion that the Comintern is striving to drag the Party "to the Right" would be regarded by us as a deliberate lie. It is precisely in order to extricate the Left, and with it the whole Party, from of the bog that we insist upon the proposed reforms.

6. The Tasks of the Party.

The criticism of the errors of the group which has been leading the Party up till now will only be of real and permanent benefit if it leads to a better and more determined fulfillment of the **positive** tasks of the Party towards winning over the masses.

At the present juncture the most important task of the Party is to react speedily and energetically upon the impending political regrouping within the German working class. The most significant symptom occurring of late months is the rising resistance among broad masses of the workers against the "Western orientation", that is, against the going over of the bourgeoisie to the side of the Entente imperialists, against the leadership of the 2. International, and the orientation of these working masses towards Soviet Russia, and — if by round-about ways — to proletarian revolution. Without overestimating the significance and speed of this process of development, the Party must accord these new symptoms a place in the centre of its attention, follow their development with the utmost care, and take them into account at every step in practical politics.

Everything depends upon the increased recruiting powers of the Party. In dealing with the masses of social democratic workers now tending to the Left, the Party must find new formulas, another tone, fresh material for agitation. It must be thoroughly informed upon all events in the camp of the social democrats, and must make a special study of the local conditions in the various districts, sub-districts, and local groups, in order to influence them by our agitation. The masses of social democratic workers now turning away from their counter-revolutionary leaders, and beginning slowly and hesitatingly, but incontestably, to turn towards proletarian revolution, must be made to feel that the Communist Party is really a party of the workers, a party which fights tenaciously for the workers' interests, for their partial demands, for their daily needs, a party which does not regard the workers merely as an object for agitation, but as class brothers, and which is sincerely endeavouring to form the proletarian united front in the class struggle.

All other political steps undertaken by the Party must be made from the standpoint of this **main task**. Above all our parliamentary work must be carried on with this standpoint in view. On every occasion and with reference to every political question, we must seek to find the platform from which the Party can speak to the masses of the workers in the trade unions and among the social democrats, to the end that they may be won over for class war. This is the light in which we must place all the questions of the Security Pact, of the League of Nations, of the trade agreements, credits, tariffs, taxation, housing policy, etc.

At the same time the combatting of the monarchist danger, the struggle against class legislation, the fight for a complete amnesty, etc., must be combined with the daily economic wage and labour struggles of the proletariat.

In order really to find access to the best section of the German social democratic workers, the fight must be taken up against those excesses which originate from the time when the struggle was carried out with the weapons in hand. The greatest damage is caused to the working class when, for instance, mutual fighting is indulged in between communists and social democrats (at meetings, among the youth etc.) which are taking place even today and for which the social democrats are responsible, although the communists also are not free from blame. Such fighths are welcomed by the counter revolutionary leaders of the German social democracy and these leaders, of course, consciously incite such a struggle. The communists must take up the initiative in order finally, to put an end to such things,

which of course presupposes the good will of the social democratic workers.

One must understand how to distinguish not only in words but in deeds, between the counter revolutionary social democratic leaders and the broad mass of the social democratic workers. Our press and in particular our factory newspapers (wall newspapers, etc.) must know how to conduct the agitation against the criminal policy of the social democratic leaders, so that every social democratic worker in the factory or workshop in question feels that he, the worker at the bench, the simple representative elected to the factory council is regarded differently from the high "Barmat" leader, who in parliament sells the worker again and again.

The real change of policy in this respect which will be perceived by all workers, will be accomplished, when the Party concentrates all its forces upon increasing our trade union work. The social democratic Party of Germany must be beaten by our trade union work. The red united front must be formed by our trade union work.

The Party, and its trade union fractions must carry on a wide scale agitation in all unions, local branches regarding the visit of the first German workers delegation to Soviet Russia. This visit must awaken a powerful response in the whole of the German labour movement.

The urgent desire for unity felt by the workers must be crystallised as speedily as possible by the development of a Left wing in the trade unions, after the pattern of the English labour movement. This is the next step forward to be taken by the German Party in the German and international unity movement. The great movement for the unity of the trade unions will win over the broadest masses, and will bring a fresh influx of members into the free trade unions, if the Communist Party becomes the driving force for trade union unity. The communists must learn to do their best, most energetic, and concrete work in the trade unions; they must **prove** to the non-party and social democratic trade union members, by means of object lessons, that they are able, in their character as Bolshevists, to be active trade union members at the same time. This means a number of fresh tasks for our fractions in the trade unions: Real penetration into trade union life, intense study of economic and political relations (the formations of trusts, rise and fall of economic prosperity, situation in various branches of industry, peculiarities of certain spheres of economics, etc.), the working out of a clear and competent tariff and social policy, the leading of labour struggles, especially the strategy of the strike, the adoption of a definite standpoint with regard to all organisation questions arising in the trade unions, the struggle for the industrial unions, the accordance of special consideration to the rôle and tasks of the shop stewards, the emphasising of the interests of juvenile workers within the trade unions, the safeguarding of the interests of the female workers, etc.

The organisation of a competent trade union department in the Central of the German CP. must afford the proof that the leaders of the party are seriously inclined to make this work the fundamental task of the Party.

The carrying out of our work in the trade unions implies a determined reorganisation of the Party in accordance with the organisation decisions made by the last Party Conference. The new statutes and lines of organisation laid down by the Party Conference in Berlin must be realised with the **utmost rapidity.** The new organisatory course of the Party is closely bound up with the new political course. **The line of action common to both consists of the transference of the preponderance of all political organisatory work performed by the Party into the workshops and factories, to the end that the masses of the workers here employed may be won over.** The following three spheres of work are to be made the chief tasks of the new organisatory course:

1. The reform of the inner Party course in the direction of the normalising and democratisation of Party life, of lively connection between the leaders and the members of the Party, by means of all the organisations of the Party.

2. A real and absolutely consistent reorganisation on the basis of the factory nuclei.

3. The organisatory comprehension and firm establishment of communist influence in all non-party labour organisations, above all in the trade unions, but at the same time in the mass organisation which are being formed among the proletariat.

The realisation of an active connection between the leaders and the members of the Party demands the abolition of supercentralisation, and the employment of fresh forces not only in the Central, but in all the leading organs of the Party, especially among the district leaders; it further demands the guarantee of collective work in the entire membership, and the closest cooperation with the Comintern.

Cooperation with the Comintern is the more necessary that it enables the Party to be enriched by the experiences gained by the whole International.

Besides the reform of the inner Party course, and the reorganisation on the basis of the factory cells, another factor of greatest importance is the rapid development of a system of really Bolshevist **Party fractions,** capable of practical work on their own initiative, in every workers' organisation, without exception, in which there are communists. This task is by no means confined to the trade unions, but applies equally to all other non-party mass organisations, whether these have alreday existed for a long time, or whether they are just being formed. The Red front fighters' League affords the best example of the new formation of proletarian mass organisations on the basis of the fighting experiences of the German proletariat. The rapid adaptation of the Party to such organisations (sport associations, tenants' league, free thinkers' league, Red women's league, etc.), and making use of the same for strengthening trade union work, are necessary.

Among the errors and defects of the leadership of the German CP., not the least is their completely wrong policy with reference to the young Communist League of Germany. The numerical weakness and the difficulties experienced by the Youth League in Germany are to be explained to a considerable extent by the fact that the Party has done next to nothing to aid the Youth League to attain a very much higher standard. The main cause of the weakness of the German Youth League lies however in the fact that up to recently it has trod the same wrong path which the Party has been led by its leaders, and has shared all the errors of the Party. It is thus the more significant that at the 10. Party Conference only the Youth openly and to the end defended the proposals of the Comintern. This is a certain symptom that the Youth has already begun to choose the right path for itself, without the aid of the Party, and even in spite of the resistance made by the Party leaders. Therefore the attitude of the representatives of the Party leaders towards the Youth was quite inadmissable as it found expression in the obstruction at the Party Conference, and the subsequent "pressure" put upon the Central Comittee of the Young Communist League of Germany. The Party must understand the fact that the adoption of such an attitude with regard to the Young Communist League is capable of destroying the whole of the communist work which has been done among the youthful workers; this work is however one of the most important prerequisites for the real Bolshevisation of the Party.

The organisations of the rural and city petty bourgeoisie require the special attention of the Party. At the same time the necessary steps must be taken in Germany towards the practical realisation of a **Leninist peasant policy** in Germany. The Party must mobilise the increasing discontent of the petty bourgeoisie and the peansantry in the questions relating to revaluation, trade agreements, credits, taxation, and tariffs, for the purpose of a common struggle against the big bourgeoisie (communist fraction work in the revalution and tenants' associations, the organisation of the vintners, small holders, tenant farmers, etc.).

The **parliamentary work** done by the Party in the whole country, in the provinces, and in the municipalities, must be conducted in the main from the point of view of promoting our work in the mass organisations. For this an indispensable prerequisite is the closest cooperation between the parliamentary fractions and the communist fractions in the trade unions, etc.

The Party must not forget for a moment that serious Right and Ultra Left dangers still continue to exist in its ranks. Mechanical measures however do not afford any safeguard against these dangers, but solely a broad, thorough system of enlightening and educative work carried out by the Party, penetrating down to the last member, and comprising every organisation and cell. The ideological overcoming of all errors in the spheres of practice and theory is best accomplished by means of the **permeation of the Party** with the principles of Leninism and of the Comintern, by means of the **application** of these principles to the

actual conditions obtaining in Germany, and by means of the practical Party tasks arising out of this application.

This work of inner Party propaganda must be consciously commenced by a broad campaign of enlightenment among the whole of the members, explaining the necessity and the political import of the present discussion.

7. Why must the change be made in the Party precisely now, and why must the change be rapid?

Many Party comrades will ask why the change in the leadership of the German CP. has become so "suddenly" necessary; in reality however it is not a matter of differences which "suddenly" arose between the Executive and the Ruth Fischer group. It is rather a question of differences which have existed during the whole course of the last eighteen months, and which have become more and more acute until the present state of affairs, entirely intolerable for the Party and for the International has been reached. The Executive has warned the leading group more than once against the continuation of their deviations. As early as the Session of the Enlarged Executive the Russian delegation informed the German delegation under the lead of Ruth Fischer, after days of serious consultation, that the continuation of the wrong inner Party course hitherto pursued would render a severe conflict inevitable. The representatives of the Executive in Germany pointed out again and again the deviations and erors of the above mentioned group. But all advice and earnest comradelike warnings remained without effect Up to the last the Executive has sought to avoid the breaking out of an open conflict and the resulting necessary organisatory measures. It was solely for this reason that the Executive confined itself to negotations with the leading group in the Party Central, and refrained, in the hope of regaining sound conditions by these means, from submitting the accumulating antagonism to the organisations and members of the Party. We have attempted to convince the group Maslow-Ruth Fischer of its errors by means of educational methods and comradelike co-operation. Despite our misgivings we avoided an open conflict, in order that we might throw no difficulties in the way of the German Left, with whose political line the Executive has solidarised more than once, at a moment when it was undertaking a severe struggle against the Right and Ultra Left deviations in the German CP.

This necessary step has been rendered easier for us by the circumstance that within the Left of the German Party the centre of a powerful opposition has been formed against the system of the comrades Maslow-Ruth Fischer. The Berlin Party Conference, and the events immediately following its close, proved finally to the Executive that all hopes of settling the differences in the course of normal co-operation are shattered. The attacks made by comrades Maslow and Ruth Fischer force upon us the urgent necessity of laying the question of the German Party openly before all the members.

May our enemies break out into a howl of triumph, and point their fingers at the sore points of the German Party. May the bourgeoisie and the social traitors of whole Germany fling scorn and derision upon the Party. Lenin taught us to expose ruthlessly all the errors of our Party, the sole Party of the vanguard of the revolutionary proletariat, with Bolshevist openess, without considering the enemy. There is no Party in the world able, like the Communist Party, to recognise and to expose its defects openly and to its logical conclusion. This is the sole pledge for the rapid and complete overcoming of these errors.

The Executive is profoundly convinced that no communist worker in Germany will permit himself to be confused or misled even for a moment by the shrieks of triumph which may certainly be anticipated from the bourgeois and social democratic press.

And may all the adherents of the Right and Ultra Left in our own ranks too consider the right moment to have come to venture forward again. May the Brandlerists declare that "the Left are bankrupt". The Communist Party of Germany will none the less advance in serried ranks without lending an ear to the cries of the Right or Ultra Left opponents.

We repeat once more: it is not the German Left which is bankrupt, but some of their leaders.

The German Left, with all its faults in the past and in the present, has never been merely a group of individuals. It has a great historical rôle to fulfil. It drew the lessons of October 1923, it defeated Brandlerism, it united the torn Party at the moment of its severest crisis.

The German Left must uphold and continue the best traditions of the vanguard of the German industrial proletariat, and of the best and most powerful Party organisations, as those of Berlin, Hamburg, the Ruhr area, and the Rhine country. At the same time it must show itself capable of eliminating everything that is wrong, immature, and un-Bolshevist from its past and present. Then it will not only be the Left, but the real, Bolshevist, leading heart of the German CP.

Lenin taught us that when we openly and ruthlessly criticise our own errors before the whole working class, then these errors have already been half overcome. During the course of the twenty five years of its history the Russion CP. has more than once exposed and overcome its weaknesses — free from all petty bourgeois sentimentality and all egoism. The German CP. will follow this example.

The main defects are not to be found in the thoroughly sound proletarian membership of the Party, but among the leaders of the leaders, who have proved incompetent. The Party is confronted by great new tasks. The situation is not developing against us, but **for** us. For some months the class struggle in Germany is no more on the downward but on the **upward** line.

It is only if the whole Party recognises all the signs of the times, and if it relies upon itself, upon its own powers, upon the Communist International, and upon the unconquerable force of the German working class, then it can overcome the crisis and lead the German proletariat to victory. In this case victory is certain.

Executive of the CI:

Zinoviev, Bucharin, Manuilski, Piatnitzki, Losovsky (Soviet Union), Jacob (France), Brown (Great Britain), Kuusinen (Finland), Scheflo (Norway), Kilbom (Sweden), Kolarov (Bulgaria), Dimitrov (Bulgaria), Boschkovitch (Jugoslavia), Katayama (Japan), Roy (India), Mitskevitsch Kapsukas (Lithuania).

Delegation of the German CP:

Thälmann, Ruth Fischer, Dengel, Schwan, Schneller, Scher, Kühne, Strötzel, Heinz Neumann and the **Central Committee of the CP. of Germany.**
(Section of the Communist International.)

Resolution of the C. C. of the C. P. of Germany on the Decision of the Executive in the German Question.

1. The C. C. of the G. C. P. approves the report on the negotiations between the delegation of the G. C. P. and the Executive of the Comintern; it agrees without reservation with the decisions of the Executive.

2. The C. C. is in agreement with the open letter addressed by the Executive to the members of the German Party, and recognises the correctness of the criticism exercised by the Executive with regard to the Maslow-Ruth Fischer group which hitherto lead the G. C. P.

3. The C. C. agrees with the organisatory decisions of the Executive, and resolves to carry them out immediately.

4. In order to pursuade the broadest masses of the Party members in all the districts and organisations of the correctness and necessity of the decisions arrived at, the Central is to organise a far-reaching enlightening activity throughout the whole Party.

5. The Central Committee, as united body, has to carry out the decisions of the Executive, and to defend them against all resistance.

6. The inner work of the Central Committee is to be organised in accordance with the new course, along the line of increased collective work, that is, of the most intense mutual co-operation among all the members and candidates of the C. C.

7. It is only possible to avoid a Party crisis if the C. C. brings the whole Party **unitedly** together in accordance with the new decisions and leads it unitedly forward on the path of practical positive tasks.

8. Every attack against the general lines laid down by the Comintern, and against the decisions newly made in the German question in particular, must be ruthlessly combatted, from whatever side it may come, whether from the Right or from the Ultra Left.

Passed by all votes against one and one abstention.

UNION OF SOVIET REPUBLICS.

The Political Situation in Georgia.

A declaration by Miglioli, delegate of the Peasants' International.

One of our collaborators asked the Italian peasant leaders Miglioli and Massarenti, who have joined the Peasants' International (Krestintern) and lately visited Georgia, to give their impressions of Georgia. Ed.

Before leaving Georgia, I consider it necessary to make a declaration with regard to this country, the more so that at the present time the press is of extrems importance for the defence of the historical truth about Georgia.

In Italy and other countries it is extremely difficult today to learn the truth about the Soviet Union. The articles and information published — including those of the social democratic press — are based on data obtained from false sources. The bourgeoisie attaches its speculations to the smallest episode, which often assume enormous proportions.

What I have to say about Georgia is of immediate interest. The bourgeois press has often published rumours of late with regard to an insurrection in Georgia, and I have made it my task to examine into these reports. This had to be done, for the reports are being exploited by the European bourgeoisie to show, firstly, that the masses of the peasantry are dissatisfied with the Soviet regime; secondly, that the Soviet government is in an unstable position and thirdly, that the Georgian government finds itself obliged to stifle the freedom of the people by means of the severest measures of suppression. These last inventions pursue at the same time the special aim of providing a breach through which the bourgeoisie may carry their offensive against the proletariat.

I shall reply to all these three questions, dealing for this purpose chiefly with my journey through West Georgia, which has been the cause of so much ink slinging.

After having visited the new textile factory in Kutais and the experimenting station for serum culture (agricultural experimenting station), which made a great impression upon us, I entered into **immediate communication with the peasants.**

I visited the district alleged to have been the seat of the last insurrection in August, but received the impression **that the mental standpoint of the peasantry does not in any manner correspond to the rumours spread abroad about their discontent.**

The insurrection movement has been prepared artificially, with the intention of attracting the peasants by means of speculation on the national question. The Soviet government was represented to be the exploiter of Georgia. I had the opportunity of seeing, in Paris, the writings of one of the leaders of the Mensheviki, in which it was maintained — and this was only recently — that in Georgia everything is in a state of ruin, and that this country is sinking deeper and deeper into misery.

This is a lie.

I have seen the enormous amount of work which has been accomplished by the Soviet government for the purpose of irrigating West Georgia with the aid of canals. I have visited the homes of the peasantry in various districts, and in one peasant's house I made the attempt to estimate the household of a poor peasant in accordance with his income and expenses. The peasant in question did of course not like to state the whole of his sources of income — for fiscal reasons — but it could be gathered **that this peasant, working alone, had earned an income of 4000 Italian lire in the course of the year, that is, a higher amount than that earned by a qualified craftsman in Italy.**

Signs of prosperity are not only visible in the homes of these peasants, but in their clothing. They are much better dressed than the peasants in many other districts of Georgia and the Soviet Union.

I had also the opportunity of speaking with **three railway workers**, former Mensheviki. What they told me was far from confirming the rumours spread by the bourgeois press. They told me of the influence exercised from outside, of the money and orders coming from abroad, of the promise of intervention in the case of an insurrection. They now felt that they have been misled, and spoke with satisfaction of the successes attained by the government, and of the endeavours being made by the government everywhere to improve conditions in the country.

The episode of the August insurrection in West Georgia has liquidated Menshevist work there for ever; they showed themselves to be deceivers in pretending that an insurrection was possible at all. An old farmer, with whom I held a conversation of deep interest, assured me that: "We shall arm ourselves to the teeth; we shall all take up weapons if there is any further sign of danger of an insurrection".

I declare openly, and with satisfaction, that **the Soviet government is pursuing a policy of far-reaching liberty, and that it is firmly and deeply rooted in the hearts of the people of Georgia.** I need only recall the great tolerance exercised towards the various religions, nationalities, customs, and traditions of the country. I know what is taking place in other countries in this respect, for instance in Poland, where the national character of the minorities, their language, and their rights, are set aside in the interests of the ruling national bourgeoisie. I still remember the history of the war among the peoples who are still living under the regime of suppression.

All these events in Georgian life can only be comprehended if we recollect the profound influence of the revolution, which has united all elements in the struggle against capitalism, and for the attainment of one sole object, the victory of the proletariat.

In Georgia, a country in which differences of custom and tradition formerly made it the constant scene of guerilla war and quarrels among the various nationalities, the revolution has swept away all this. The Soviet idea and the genius of its leaders have worked miracles.

I repeat once more that the Soviet idea is deeply rooted in the revolution. It need not be said that a more intense activity is necessary in order to enhance the welfare of the masses, and in order to educate them in the direction necessary for the attainment of better results in production. I have had the opportunity of seeing that this task is already being taken up.

The road to the goal is still long, but I am fully confident that it will be quickly travelled, for the Georgian government, as a Soviet government, does not need to think of the defence of its regime.

It is difficult to find a suitable designation for the policy of the capitalist governments in Europe, who pretend not to observe the actuality of the Soviet Union, misrepresent it by false reports, and lend their patronage to absurd adventures, without comprehending that the adventurers have long since been political corpses.

The policy of misjudgment is being replaced by the policy of hypocrisy. The leaders of the bourgeois states are declaring today that they are prepared to enter into political and commercial relations with the Soviet Union.

They imagine that by this policy they leave their hands free for fighting against the workers in their own countries, and in actual fact they are preparing to form a bloc for an armed offensive of all reactionary elements against the Soviet Union.

But the day is approaching when this mask will fall. The sincerity characterising the Union of Soviet Republics in its international relations will never find its counterpart in the bourgeois governments. At the present moment there is not a single political combination of states which would decline to adopt the fight against the Soviet Union as its secret goal.

I am however profoundly convinced that all these plans will be shattered, for reaction will be paralysed everywhere by the revolutionary will and by the uninterrupted growth of organisation of the proletariat.

I send a parting greeting to the workers and peasants of Georgia, and am fully confident that in doing so I am expressing the unanimous feeling of the working masses of Italy.